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Abstract
This paper assesses impacts and constraints of the implementation of universal coverage
(UC) in Thailand’s public health system so far in selected provinces of the northeast region.
Based on incidence and findings discovered in the survey, we can draw out a depiction to
explain linkages and systematic consequences of the situations from the Primary Care
Units (PCUs) to secondary and tertiary level hospitals. The depiction simply describes the
current situation and the impact of UC on the whole system of care provisions with specific
constraints at each facility level, and illustrates the systematically negative cyclic conse-
quences of those constraints. Due to the “primary constraints” at all facility levelsmainly
because of a shortage of health workers and inadequate budget financingthe Sarng-Nam-
Sorm (health promotion and disease prevention ahead of curative health care) and Klai-
Baan-Klai-Jai (Health facility near dwelling) strategies of the UC policy face failures at the
PCU level, which, as a result, do not reduce, but rather increase number of the patients at
the hospital level. Unbearable workloads and poor equipment with a lack of specific
needed professionals at most secondary level hospitals at the district level has tended to
push them to more often refer inpatient cases to tertiary level hospitals in the provincial
cities because it is better and safer for patients. This is often viewed by the tertiary level
hospital as over-referral, and puts a tremendous burden on them in terms of physical
workloads and financial cost. In this study, we explained that these impacts from facilities
in lower levels to those at higher levels are “linking consequences,” which will eventually
negatively result backward on the lower level facilities in terms of “secondary constraints.”
In the long run, if no attempt is made to ease the constraints and improve the situation
mainly regarding the inadequacy of the health workforce and fundingthis vicious cycle
of negative consequences could collapse the whole public health care system and UC.
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I Introduction
To accomplish sustainable health financing and an efficient service delivery system,
Thailand’s universal coverage (UC) policy, which was adopted in , incorporated
financial reforms with a closed-end provider payment method and strengthened the
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primary care network with more attention on health promotion and disease prevention
works (PP).
An annual per capita health budget inclusive of healthcare workers’ salariesthe
capitation ratewas adopted in financing health services from contracted service pro-
viders, hospitals and their networks, nationwide. This has affected hospitals’ revenues
and expenditure, especially that of public hospitals of the Ministry of Public Health
(MOPH), as the UC budget on the capitation basis has replaced and reduced major
incomes of the hospitals from patient payments of those who were not insured during the
pre-UC period. Due to persisting inequitable distributions of public health personnel
across the country, affections of the salary inclusive capitation vary in public hospitals
from region to region. This was determined by the regulation of salary subtractions from
the capitation budget, whether the salary of health workers was subtracted and allocated
at the provincial level or at the national level.
In the beginning years of the UC implementation, a single capitation was allocated
equally to provinces with aims to achieve equity of financing based on the size of the
population being taken care of by hospitals in each province. Salary and allowances for
health workers were inclusive and allocated at the provincial level.
This created financial disruptions in hospitals of affluent provinces, especially in the
central region, having a (too) high ratio of health personnel to the population, while
creating financial surplus in hospitals with a (too) low health personnel to population
ratio in peripheral provinces, especially in the northeast region.)
The single capitation rate was massively opposed by providers and hospitals, mainly
in the central region, who were facing financial difficulties as the capitation budget after
salary subtraction was inadequate to cover the operational costs of service provision at
the hospitals. Supported by “conservative” academics at the MOPH who disagreed with
“the reformist” idea that re-distributions of health personnel could be achieved through
the financing mechanisms, from FY  on, the capitation budget was allocated to
provinces after salary subtraction at the national level to undermine resistance and avoid
possible conflicts from affected hospitals [Na-Ranong et al. ].
The decision was strongly opposed by some groups of health professionals and
providers, including the Rural Doctor Society (RDS), which criticised that inequality gaps
 The number of health personnel in total in Thailand is considered still inadequate com-
pared to the total population. The equal single capitation rate with salary subtraction at
the provincial level was proposed in financing contracted public hospitals with UC to
re-distribute health personnel which were bunching in the central region and provincial
cities more to the needed regions and distant areas. In this way, the amount of budget
allocated to a hospital would be based on the population figure under the hospital’s responsi-
bility. Those in distant areas and in shortage of health personnel but taking care of a large
population would be empowered to hire additional workers and attract more health person-




across regions and provinces would be widened with an unfair amount of health budget
allocated on this basis. Differing gaps of the total UC budget, after including the salary
allocated at the national level, across the provinces would be as high as  times ranging
from  baht to 	
 baht/head/year [Watcharanukulkiat cited in Mohanamai website
].
Regarding the operational policy of UC, Sarng-Nam-Sorm (SNS: health promotion
and disease prevention (PP) ahead of curative health care) and Klai-Barn-Klai-Jai (KBKJ:
health facility near dwelling) strategic plans were promoted to campaign for the good
health of the Thai people in the long run to save costs of curative care, and improve
accessibility to health care by those who fall sick. A concept of Primary Care Unit (PCU)
to be as a gatekeeper providing health PP services and primary care to patients in the
local area, screening those who need higher level of care and transferring them to the
hospital via the referral networks was presented and empirically adopted.
Under this context, public hospitals of the MOPH in all districts across the country
are contracted with the  Baht Scheme in the structure as a Contracted Unit for Primary
Care (CUP), which are compulsorily required to have at least one PCU for every 	
residents in their area of responsibility. Except the districts in Bangkok, a CUP is
generally spoken to be a primary care network taking care of residents in one district
territory. In municipal areas and provincial cities, new PCUs were set up as a unit within
the hospital or a separate unit out of the hospital, while in the rural or peripheral areas,
they were mostly upgraded and re-branded from existing Health Centers (HCs).
Under the CUP structure, PCUs and HCs are supposed to have at least one nurse
working to provide primary care service and get support from the hospital in terms of
technical advice and rotations of the medical team with doctors and other professionals
to provide specific curative care periodically. The main tasks of the permanent staff at
PCUs/HCsmainly Public Health Officers (PHOs), health academics and public health
management officers (or the PCU/HC’s head)are more focused on health PP works in
the local communities with the :  work task ratio of PP and curative works.
The UC budget to PCUs/HCs was switched from a top-down basis of public health
structure to be on a capitation basis via the inclusive budget to the CUP, plus fixed cost
allowances from the Provincial Public Health Office (PPHO). On the line of public
command in the district, the District Public Health Office (DPHO) acts as an evaluating
and monitoring agent of PCUs and HCs’ performances. Simply, the structure of a CUP
under the MOPH is presented in Fig. .
These changes, both of the financing and of the structural reforms of health service
delivery, have affected providers in many ways from managing staff to health practition-
ers.
In this study, the opinions and views of health service providers in Khonkaen and
Kalasin provinces will be assessed and presented regarding the impact of the UC
implementation in a variety of issues with attempts to figure out at the operating level
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(aside from policy designing level) what are the difficulties and constraints they have
been facing since, or even before, the financing and structural reforms of the UC
implementation.
In the next section, overviews of the field surveys are given, detailed scope of the
interview issues and basic information about the two provinces and the respondent
groups, by professions and workplaces. Then, in section III, a summary of the opinions
and views of the health service providers is presented by regarding interview issues.
Section IV and V describe the difficulties and consequences of UC’s financing reforms
and health worker shortages at public health facilities, which are perceived as significant
constraints on service provisions by the providers. Concluding remarks on systematic
constraints and cyclic consequences of the problems in the public health service delivery
system are, lastly, given in section VI.
II Overview of the Field Surveys: Interviews of Health Care and Service
Providers in Khonkaen and Kalasin Provinces
For the investigations, the northeast region was selected because it is the region hosting
the largest number of population who are comparatively poorer than those in other
regions and are equipped and provided with public health resources to the least advan-
tage. Population ratios to health personnel and hospital beds are the highest in this
region, nearly two times the national figures. The region is tentatively the most affected
by the switching of salary subtraction of the capitation budget from the provincial level
to the national level, which favours much better the affluent provinces in the central
region. Differences of the total capitation amount to the provinces in the central region
and the northeast region have been a large discrepancy since then, and the inequitable
distribution of health personnel across the regions is left unsolved.
The field surveys were conducted during JulyAugust  and JanuaryFebruary
 in Khonkaen and Kalasin provinces. Both provinces are located in the upper part of
the region,  km and  km from Bangkok, the national capital city, respectively.
By the population size (	 million) and location in the heart of the region, Khonkaen
Fig.  CUP Structure and Main Constituent Parts
  	
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is not only a commercial and political centre but also a hub of health care services and
education. The province hosts a regional level hospitalKhonkaen Regional Hospital
and a university hospital of the largest university in the regionSrinakarin Hospital,
Khonkaen University. The province is subdivided into  districts and  minor districts,
having provincial borders with  neighbouring provinces including Kalasin in the east.
Kalasin is a medium-size province with  million population, further from Bang-
kok, located about  km from Khonkaen. The largest hospital in the provincial city
Kalasin Hospitalis a general level hospital, capable of providing only primary and
secondary care service. For more sophisticated treatment needing advanced tertiary care
level, the patients are referred to regional level hospital in Khonkaeneither Khonkaen
Hospital or Srinakarin Hospital.
In accord with the regional referral network of the hospitals of the MOPH, Khonkaen
Hospital is a regional level hospital which receives referred cases of patients who need
upper-secondary and tertiary care from general level hospitals and community hospitals
both in Khonkaen and neighbouring provinces.
Hospitals that have a referral network with Khonkaen Hospital include Kalasin
Hospital, and all the community hospitals in Khonkaen and Kalasin. Patients from a
community hospital in Kalasin are at first referred to Kalasin Hospital, then, only cases
that need a higher level of care than Kalasin Hospital’s capacity to provide will be
transferred across the province to Khonkaen Hospital. The referral is basically required
to proceed in order from the sub-districts to the district level, from districts to the
provincial level, and from provinces to the regional level. In other words, the networks
are in order from PCUs/HCs to a community hospital,) from community hospitals to a
general hospital and general hospitals to a regional hospital. A diagram simply depicting
the network between Khonkaen and Kalasin is given in Fig. .
In the field surveys, interviews were conducted with a health academic at a PPHO of
each province, to find out basic information regarding the current situation of the UC
operation and health service delivery system in the province, and with health practition-
ers at hospitals and PCUs/HCs, including doctors, nurses, Public Health Officers (PHOs),
management officers, and the director, in 	 and 
 districts (or CUPs) of Khonkaen and
Kalasin, respectively.
In Khonkaen, the districts visited were Mueng (provincial city), Namphong, Khaosua-
nkwang, Chonnabot and Waengnoi. In Kalasin, the districts visited were Mueng (provin-
cial city), Hueymek, Sahatsakhan and Kuchinarai. At each district, the community
hospital (or the general/regional hospital in Mueng district), PCUs/HCs and the DPHO
were visited for the interview sessions. Number of total interview respondents are 	, of
which 
 are in Khonkaen and 	 are in Kalasin. By profession, the respondents consisted
 An exception is Mueng (provincial city) district where PCUs or HCs directly refer the cases
to general or regional hospitals in the province where they are contracted as Mueng CUP.
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of  doctors (including the director of the hospitals who all are doctors as required by
MOPH’s regulation),  nurses, and  PHOs, health academics and management officers
(health academics and management officers will be generally referred to as a PHO group
later on, as both of the groups were upgraded from PHO).
During the interview, each respondent was asked for his/her opinions and sugges-
tions toward a variety of issues, with related sub-topics. All were mainly about the
impacts of the UC implementation and the situation of the health service delivery system
in the province.
Fig.  Medical Care and Referral Networks: District, Provincial and Regional Levels
  	
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III Providers’ Views of the UC Implementation
  Impressions
Generally, the providers agree with the concept of the  Baht Scheme  ) and goodwill of
the government in implementing UC. Budget management and allocation are seen as
being more flexible than before, which was a top-down basis along the public command
line, and more clearly defined with concrete strategies, policies and expected outcomes to
the providers. However, the implementation in practice was criticized or being carried
out without a good planning and preparations. The un-readiness and difficulties on the
providers in the beginning years are summarized briefly as follows:
a ) The database of the population eligible to the  Baht Scheme, and costs of
health service provisions were not properly developed. This affected the calcula-
tion and allocation of the UC capitation budget, which were based on the number
of population in each area. Using lagged information of health care unit costs
and census registration, the capitation rates calculated was later on found to be
inadequate to cover the actual costs of service provisions at health facilities.
b ) The health service delivery system and health workers were not prepared to the
changes. The structure of public health organizationPPHO, DPHO, hospitals
and PCUs/HCswere not yet properly reorganized and a lot of confusion
regarding the UC policies and regulations were expressed by the providers. The
regulations, especially of budget allocation to facilities, were remarked to have
been adjusted very often in the beginning years.
c ) The adoption of UC and the  Baht Scheme were over-exploited for political
benefits and popularity by the government. It was over-advertised to the Thai
people and misled them to highly expect and depend too much on the public
health service system. In spite of many troubles of the scheme, any adjustments
for better appropriateness were hardly done if that affected and lowered the
popularity of the scheme among the people. The government did not inform the
population about the whole truth about the limitations of budget and health
benefits that the scheme could afford to provide to the public. Furthermore, the
Thai patients were not well-educated about how to utilize the care system. Most
of the patients, even with minor illness, often directly went to a hospital rather
 The newly introduced medical scheme with universal coverage to cover those who were
not receiving health benefits from the two existing public medical schemesthe Civil Ser-
vant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) and the Social Security Scheme (SSS). The covered
population by this scheme are enabled to access health care at the registered health
facilities for only a  baht (about  US dollar) co-payment with each use. The scheme is
a taxation-based financing system.
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than a PCU/HC. This increased significantly the number of patients at hospitals
throughout the provinces, which contradicted to the policy’s strategy of a
primary care network.
  Work Impacts on the Providers
According to the national figure of care utilization rates and number of patients at the
MOPH’s public hospitals in Tables  and , respectively, health care seeking behaviors of
Thai patients are found to change during the period from  to  (before and after
the UC implementation).
Patients who needed medical care, either OP or IP care, visited proportionately more
facilities of the primary and lower-secondary levelPCUs/HCs and community hospitals
and, consequently, visited fewer facilities of the upper-secondary and tertiary level
general/regional hospitals, university hospitals and public hospitals of other ministries
in  compared to in .
Table  Patterns of Health Care Utilization : , ,  and  ()
Types of Treatment of
the Last Time of Illness
Outpatient Care (OP) Inpatient Care (IP)
    change
( and )   
 change
( and )
Self-medication (drug store)     	
PCUs/HCs   	 
Community Hospitals 	 







 University Hospitals    

Other public hospitals    	
Private clinics/polyclinics   	   NA   NA
Private hospitals 	
 	 	
   	 	 
  

Others         
Total      
Source: [Thailand, NSO ; ; ]
Table  Number of Patients in Public Hospitals of the MOPH Nationwide: ,  and *
Years
Numbers of Patient Rates of Patient

































 change ( and )  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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However, this does not imply that the number of patients at upper-secondary or
tertiary hospitals would decrease. As indicated in Table , the number of patients at
public hospitals of the MOPH in total increased significantly during this period, espe-
cially in-patient numbers which rose as high as  percent from the number in . More
than  percent of the patients were admitted for IP care at upper-secondary and tertiary
hospitals (Table  ).
From the field surveys, the numbers of patients visiting for either OP or IP care were
reported higher at nearly all facilities after the UC implementation. Situations with
opinions of the providers toward the increased utilization rates were variously remarked.
For OP care, the utilizations at both PCUs/HCs and hospitals reportedly increased
significantly. For example, at a HC in Huaymek district, the number of patients increased
from  to 	 cases per month. At Khonkean Hospital, the number was informed to
increase from 		
 cases to 	 cases per day, while at Waengnoi Hospital, the
cases doubled.
Most providers at the PCU/HC level reported that patients could really access care
more easily with the 
 Baht Card. However, especially those having the card with
“Thor” who were exempted from the 
 baht co-payment, sometimes over-utilized the
care by going to PCU/HC just to ask for medicine to keep spare at home. In some cases,
obliged to co-pay 
 baht per visit, patients were over-demanding medicine and treat-
ments which were not really needed just to satisfy themselves that they had received the
value of the co-payment they had paid. From a more optimistic point of view, some
providers did not see this situation as a problem but as a good sign that people, even in
the rural areas, are currently more concerned about their health and were less frequently
buying drugs by themselves from local drug stores, some of which do not have a
certificate or license from the public health agencies. In addition, this was seen as a good
opportunity for providers at PCUs/HCs to know better the behavior of people in the
community, which would help them to conduct PP works to change the adverse health
behaviors of people in the long-run more efficiently.
At hospitals, the providersdoctors and nursesviewed the increased OP cases in
the hospital as, in some aspects, over-utilizing behaviors and the failures of KBKJ and
SNS strategies of the UC policy. According to the strategies, patients who needed OP care
were supposed to visit a PCU/HC near their dwelling and later be referred to the hospital
by the PCU/HC if a higher level of care was needed. In this regard, the number of OPs at
the hospital was supposed to decrease if the strategies were successfully accomplished
and the hospital would be able to concentrate better on IP care provision. Because of a
shortage of health workersboth in Khonkaen and Kalasinand an inadequate UC
budget to the CUP, the hospital could not support the allocation of nurses and rotations
of medical team to PCU/HC networks. Capacity in providing primary care and PP
service to the local people of PCU/HC was then limited in the same CUP. Trust in the
quality of care provided at the PCU/HC level are also worse in the views of people and
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this pushes them to come directly to the hospital for OP care, especially those residing
near to or in easy access of the hospital.
Regarding the problems of care over-utilization and over-demanding patients, some
respondents expressed that it was the government’s mistake in over-advertising the 
Baht Scheme and at the same time not informing the whole truth to people about the
limitations of public capacity in providing health benefits. This causes people to
over-expect and depend too much on public assistance. People’s attitudes need to be
adjusted to see more importance of self-care and health promotion.
For IP care, even if the number of cases was higher at the hospital level, most of the
patients that were diagnosed by doctors really needed the care. However, at Khonkaen
and Kalasin hospitals, referred cases for IP care from community hospitals both in the
same and neighboring provinces increased massively.
Most of providers at the PCU/HC level expressed not many changes in their work
patterns. However, work tasks, especially PP service provisions, were required to be of
higher quality and were strictly evaluated with intensive-indicators by the MOPH. Many
PP works were rushed to finish in a short time but supplied with limited budget and staff.
Newly constructed population databases (so-called “family folders”) and software were
also still problematic and not familiar to the providers. With higher requirements on
quality and more expectation from both patients and the government, according to the
SNS and KBKJ strategies, insufficiencies in the number of staff and budget have hugely
increased workloads at the PCU/HC level.
At community hospitals, respondents reported higher workloads in terms of care
quality improvements accelerated by higher expectations of patients. The lack of
practitioners (doctors, nurses, etc.) was seen as the factor driving workloads and deterio-
rating the quality of care provided, which consequently brought a higher risk of malprac-
tice and stress to the practitioners.
At Khonkaen and Kalasin Hospitals, higher workloads were also perceived by the
providers but mostly from the larger number of referred IP cases from community
hospitals. The vice director of Kalasin Hospital claimed that even if, based on the
Geographical Information System (GIS), the hospital is equipped with health personnel
comparatively better than other community hospitals in the province, the hospital is in
trouble with the referred cases which were financially unprofitable but causing huge
workloads on the hospital’s workers.
  Impacts on the Relationship between Providers and Patients: Medical Malpractice and
Suing by Patients  )
Since the UC was implemented, the issue of protecting the health service’s consumers and
 “The malpractice suit is a symptom of the breakdown in the doctor-patient relationship and
most suits grow from the interaction of suit-prone doctor and suit-prone patient” [Somers




patient’s rights has been given attention and widely promoted to both the general people
and health service providers. The Legislative Act of National Health Security  (Issue
) has allowed patients to sue providers and health facilities if medical malpractice has
occurred during, or as a consequence of, medical treatments or processes causing physi-
cal damage or loss. From then on, suing and malpractice reports by patients of health
providers have become more prevalent on mass media, such as newspapers and TV news
reports.
This has brought a concern about negative impacts on patient-doctor relationships
as well as anxiety on part of the providers in providing care treatment to patients,
especially in a case with severe and complicated conditions, under current constraints of
care provision ability at many public health facilities nationwide [Pakasith ].
At PCUs/HCs, providers mostly reported no changes of the relationship and attitude
of patients toward service providers. On the other hand, many of them mentioned better
and closer relationships with people in the community because of the requirement of PP
work that push providers to visit people at their residencies more often.
At the hospital level, some providers perceived that patients’ attitudes toward health
practitioners have changed. Some values of the practitioner-patient relationship have
been destroyed, commercialized and replaced by a customer-seller relationship. Many
doctors and nurses viewed that medical suing by patients are a cause of depression and
a critical pressure that affects practitioners’ courage to provide care services. It is
accelerated by the mass media that tried to bring the issue into the public concern. The
number of staff at public facilities are inadequate and overworked with more patients
coming to the hospital as a result of the UC implementation. With more pressure and
higher expectations from the patients but less time for diagnosing, the public health
practitioners, especially doctors, were in a higher risk situation.
Moreover, when practitioners need to protect themselves from medical malpractice,
they have to diagnose patients carefully using all possible methods, which actually might
not be really necessary and wasteful. This increases the costs of health services to the
hospital and possibly pushes it into financial problems. Empirically, at community
hospitals where medical instruments are not adequately equipped, doctors would be less
confident to practice IP care, especially care that needs an operation, because of the high
risk of medical errors and malpractice. After weighing between “risks” and “costs of
referral,” the doctors tend to refer more IP cases to higher level hospitals in the province
Khonkaen and Kalasin Hospitalswhich increases workloads at those hospitals and
possibly causes conflicts between the hospitals.
Being optimistic, some providers mentioned that the practitioner-patient relation-
ship is still unchanged, based on sympathy and respect, not only “duty,” between service
providers (sellers) and receivers (buyers). They agreed that the protection of patients’
rights is necessary and beneficial to both patients and providers as it pushes the
providers to communicate and give better information regarding medical treatments and
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diagnosis to the patients. And, at the same time, it is good for the patients to realize and
be aware of their own right to be protected, which was quite neglected in the past. In the
long run, the providers hoped that this would bring about a closer practitioner-patient
relationship and higher quality as well as transparency of health care and services
provided by the health care system.
The issues of “patients’ rights” and “patients’ responsibilities” were raised by many
respondents. They argued that because UC has misinformed and over-advertised the 
Baht Scheme, people currently misunderstand the UC intentions and are over-dependent
on public health assistance. “Patients’ rights” are necessary to be protected but they
should come together with the understanding of “patients’ responsibilities” also.
Conforming to the patient-centered model that argues that doctors and patients live
in different worlds, “the world of individual patient and her or his unique experience of
ill health and the biomedical world of clinical experts” [Badura : ], doctor-patient
communication is considered crucial, besides a more active role and empowerment of
patients in the health care system.
  Sarng-Nam-Sorm (SNS) Strategy: Policy, Practice and Constraints at the PCU/HC Level
This question was purposely asked to the providers at the PCU/HC level. Regarding the
policy intention with the SNS strategy, most respondents viewed the SNS as a good
conceptual strategy for the health service system in the long run. They believe that if the
strategy successfully proceeds with intensive disease prevention and health promotion
(PP) attempts, the health status of the Thai people will be improved which, in return,
reduces the number of patients needing curative care at health facilities. This will help
lessen the national expenditure on health of both private and public sectors because, as
empirically shown in many countries, the cost of PP service is much less than the cost of
curative health care services.
In practice, even if PP work is perceived to have been given more attention from the
health policy agenda with more purposeful work plans, the implementation is facing
many difficulties and constraints from both the nature of PP work itself, and the
unsupportive workforce and budget, specifically at the PCU/HC level.
A The Nature of PP Work
PP work is mainly about attempts to change and adjust unhealthy behaviors of people.
This is time consuming and concerns many controllable and uncontrollable factors.
According to the well-known Lalonde’s model for health prevention and promotion
policy [Lalonde  cited in Eilers ], five key factors that influence an individual’s
health are  ) personal characteristics,  ) the physical environment,  ) the social
environment,  ) lifestyle and 	 ) the health care system. In this regard, PP work needs
to be pursued continuously with good cooperation from the people. Health workers must




Moreover, the work often needs health workers to go and visit people in their homes to
help educate about health knowledge and observe their lifestyles. Much of the work is
possible only after normal working hours in the evening, which may not be convenient
to the health workers. These issues were seen as being very tough and difficult by
respondents at the PCU/HC level.
B  Inadequate Workforce with Heavy Workloads
This point is about the lack of nurses and the insufficient number of health workers,
mainly the PHO group, at most PCUs/HCs. This is in contrast to the findings from a
study conducted in the four regions nationwide each of eight selected provinces, includ-
ing Khonkaen, by Pagaiya et al. [], which indicated that the number of existing staff
was adequate for work at the PCU/HC level.
According to work tasks, at least  health workers are remarked to be minimally
required at a PCU/HC, that is,  nurse,  PHOs, and  management staff (head of the
PCU/HC).) In reality, there are only, on average,  to  workers for every 		
population at PCUs/HCs, mostly without nurses in Khonkaen and Kalasin (except the
PCU/HC situated in or separated from but close to the hospital). The  to  existing
workers, mostly PHOs, are required to practice primary curative care for patients (which
is actually supposed to be performed by a nurse) and also go out to communities in the
sub-district to provide PP services to people. By rotations, at least one worker needs to
stand by at the PCU/HC for patients who might come, while the rest go out to the
communities.)
With huge amounts of paperwork and a significantly larger number of patients
coming for care after the UC implementation, all providers at many PCUs/HCs need
to be at the PCU/HC during the day and go out to the communities for PP work in the
evening.
) This is a major constraint in achieving PP works as planned by the SNS
strategy. The work proportion between curative care and PP service provisions is
 According to the requirement of workforce at the PCU/HC level by the MOPH, one PHO is
optimally assigned for every 	 population while one nurse is assigned for every 	
population.
 Because there was no supporting team at the PCU/HC level, for each patient case, the
worker needs to perform all the processes from finding the patient’s health folder, diagnos-
ing, treating patients, prescribing medicine, supplying and labeling the medicine he/she
prescribed, and filing the report on the computer data base.

 After the UC implementation, some work tasks of health rehabilitation were transferred
from the hospital to PCUs/HCs in the same CUP, such as periodic clinics for diabetic
patients. This was hoped to help the patients as they need not to come as far to the
hospital. A medical team visits the PCUs/HCs on the appointed date to meet them instead.
This is of benefit to the patients but becomes another work task for the PCU/HC’s workers
as they have to stand by nearly the whole day to support the medical team and cannot go
out to conduct PP work or do their own jobs.
C. C=6B8=6C : Impacts and Constraints of Universal Coverage in Thailand’s Public Health
241
proposed to be :  by the UC policy but this is not practicable in all of the PCUs/HCs
visited. Usually, the proportion is : , :  or even : .
C  Unsupportive UC Budget for PP Work  )
Even if some literature has evidenced a greater incentive for providers to support
self-care and health promotion of patients in the health system with “capitation” as a
provider payment method [Hibbard et al. 	
], this is not the case in the actual situation
of PP work in the field. Of the limited UC budget allocated to a CUP, the largest part is
assigned for curative care (about  for OP and IP care), which is performed mainly at
the hospital level, while a small part is transferred to the PCU/HC level for PP service
provisions (about 
). The amount of budget per head reaching PCUs/HCs for PP work
after fixed costs and OT allowances for the workers was only about 	 baht/head/
year in 	. This amount is claimed to be nearly not enough even for purchasing needed
medical products let alone for disease prevention work.
Supportive budgets for workers to go out to communities for PP work, for example,
for transportation costs, gas for motorcycle, or mobile work payments, moreover, are
indicated as not provided. In this regard, some respondents suggested that the capitation
budget should not be only clearly defined but also “strictly followed in practice” to
separate the budget portion for each health work into OP and IP care and PP services.
The budget for PP work should be transferred directly to the PCU/HC level, and should
not pass through the CUP or the hospital.
Under the current situation that UC budget as a whole is inadequate to finance all the
assigned work of the CUP, the budget for PP work, which is transferred via the CUP,
could be partly pulled out and used for curative care at the hospital before being
allocated to the PCU/HC level. Under this context, working at PCUs/HCs for PP services
would be very inflexible and dependent on the perspectives of the hospital’s director
(CUP’s head), which could be disadvantageous as the director usually pays more atten-
tion to curative care at the hospital than PP services at the PCU/HC level. Consistent to
a recommendation of a study in Phitsanulok province by Kumluang et al. [	], budget
allocation to the PCU/HC level should consider the demand side and take the specific
needs of the local communities into account more than at the present.
Arguably, many respondents remarked that the SNS strategy was written well in the
UC policy but mal-practiced by mismatched UC budget allocation and the actual im-
plementation. UC and the  Baht Scheme are claimed to focus mainly on curative care,
allocating more budget and financial support to the hospital level and health practition-
ers there, than to the PCU/HC level and PHOs who are the main practitioners of the PP
work. The  Baht Scheme was also advertised by the government as providing nearly
 UC budget allocations for CUPs of the MOPH’s hospitals in Khonkaen [	] and Kalasin




free curative care services, which accelerated the increase of people coming for curative
care at hospitals and PCUs/HCs rather than taking care, preventing disease, and promot-
ing their own good health.
IV Health Service Financing Reforms: Health Budget Allocation
on the Capitation Basis, and the Co-payment
Currently, during the transitional period of the National Health Security Act, the UC
budget from the NHSO to public health facilities of the MOPH is transferred via the
MOPH. As mentioned previously, the budget is provided to cover all expenditure of
health service provision activities for the UC patients and also includes salary and
payments of public health workers practicing at the facilities. Initially, the budget
allocated to the provincial level was intended to include the salary budget with an aim to
re-allocate health personnel from over-staffed areas to under-staffed areas. Nevertheless,
the intention was not accomplished due to massive resistance from the affected groups.
From  up to the present, FY , the annual UC budget to public health facilities of
the MOPH has subtracted the salary part at the national level before being allocated to
the provincial level. The salary budget for public health workers has been allocated at
the national level since then (the UC budget subtracted for salary accounts for  percent
of the total amount of the salary of public health officers. The other  percent is
subtracted from the facilities’ revenues from patients of the CSMBS and the SSS).
At the national level, the capitation rates approved by the government were defined
with specific rates for each given work task, of which the part for health (OP and IP) care
provisions counted for around  percent. However, at the provincial level, the allocation
and management of the UC capitation budget were differed from province to province
and was determined by communal decisions by related actors in the province. Fig.  and
Fig. 	 depicted the allocation and management methods of the UC budget at the PPHO
to public health facilities and CUPs of the MOPH in Khonkaen [	] and Kalasin [
],
respectively.) As we can see, the UC budget per head after salary subtraction (with some
budget buffered at the national level) to the provinces were only about 
	 percent of
  In both provinces, up to FY 
, the UC budget per head was allocated equally to all
public hospitals (all CUPs) in the province. This was complained to be unfair to hospitals
with a small number of populationespecially community hospitals in rural districts of the
provincebecause they tended to get too little UC budget but needed to bear fixed costs in
running hospitals which did not vary from bigger hospitals. In addition, bigger, higher
level hospitals in provincial citiesgeneral/regional hospitalsusually could obtain more
revenue from patients of the CSMBS and the SSS than smaller, lower level hospitals. For
FY , with guidance from the MOPH and the NHSO, the budget allocation to CUPs and
facilities in the provinces tends to be differentiated to the size and level of the facility. The
proposed proportion of capitation rate to regional hospitals, general hospitals and community
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Fig.  UC Budget Allocation for CUPs of the MOPH’s Hospitals in Khonkaen,  (summary)
Source: [Thailand, Department of Health Insurance, Khonkaen Provincial Public Health Office,
Khonkaen. Obtained: June, ]
Note: In out of  total population in Khonkaen  (	





the approved capitation rate in the given fiscal year.
From the charts, the budget management in Khonkaen is more, with specific deter-
mined percentage, based on defined dimensions of health workOP and IP care and PP
worksthan in Kalasin, where the budget seems allocated rather based on expenditure
items (budget was not allocated as a specific percentage but in amount for each expend-
iture item). However, calculated into percentage proportions by the dimensions of health

hospitals at the national level for budget in FY  are  baht:  baht: 	


baht, respectively. The lower level (implying smaller size) hospitals are to be allocated a
larger budget per head than the higher level (bigger size) hospitals.
Fig.  UC Budget Allocation for CUPs of the MOPH’s Hospitals in Kalasin, 	 (summary)
Source: [Thailand, Department of Health Insurance, Kalasin Provincial Public Health Office,
Kalasin (Obtained: June, )] with adaptation by the author
Note: *In 	, out of around  total population in Kalasin, 

	 () were
covered by the  Baht Scheme.
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work, the budget in Kalasin was allocated not much differently from the allocation in
Khonkaenabout  percent for OP and IP care, and  percent for PP works.) The
restabout  percentof the budget, which was kept at the Kalasin PPHO as provin-
cial buffer money, were, somehow, significantly higher than Khonkaen, which was only
	 percent.
Asked regarding the adequacy of the UC budget and appropriateness of the capita-
tion rates of the 
 Baht Scheme so far, the respondents both at the PCU/HC level and the
hospital level were indecisive to answer remarking that it was up to which criteria would
be used.
If “adequacy” was meant in regard of the survival of the health facility and its
financing, the answer mostly would be that it was enough and the hospital could survive,
even with some financial deficits and debts. However, if “adequacy” was meant in
relation to assigned work tasks and expected outcomes of the UC policy, it was said to be
hardly enough and inadequate to have the facility achieving all work assignments at the
quality levels required by the NHSO, the MOPH and the patients. In addition, in this
regard, investments for long-run development and quality improvement of care provided
at the facility were said to have been forgotten, due to the limitations and inadequacy of
the budget.
The capitation rates so far were mentioned to be inadequate and under-estimated.
Furthermore, the worse thing was that net amounts of the capitation budget reaching the
facility were even less, because of the buffering of budget at both the national (the
MOPH) and provincial levels (the PPHO). From a recent study, the capitation rates were
confirmed inadequate to cover the actual costs of health care and service provision at
public health facilities nationwide as presented in Table 
. This was caused by the use of
lagged data in the estimations which was inaccurate and, also, bargaining on the rates at
the national level when the approved rates by the government were lower than the
proposed ones by the estimation committee. In addition, as noted by Chanduayvit [],
 The author accepts that the comparison is not completely practicable as the data of each
province is for different years. Here, only the logics of budget allocation and management
between the provinces are intentionally compared.
Table  The Capitation Rates: The Approved and Should-Be Rates from Updated Estimations
Capitation Rate (baht/head)  
  
Proposed by the committee of capitation estimation
Estimated with actual information in the years shown
Approved by the government and allocated to contracted facilities
The gap between the approved rate and the should-be rates (baht/head)

































the care utilization rate numbers from the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) of the
National Statistical Office (NSO) that were used in the calculation of capitation rates so
far also underestimated the actual situations. Since , total deficits in the whole health
care system are expectedly around  million baht. This problem has already been
realized by the NHSO and the capitation rate estimation committee. The situation
hopefully will be relieved by the capitation rate which has been increased to as high as
	 baht for FY  (an 

 percent increase from the rate of FY ; 	 baht).
Some providers mentioned that compared to work tasks and expected outcome by
the NHSO and the MOPH, the budgets of FY  and  were enough to cover only
about  percent of the actual costs. The situation at present is that most facilities
PCUs/HCs and hospitalsare trying not to be indebted and carefully manage their
financial status with the limited budget to which they were allocated. Only really
necessary items and new medical equipment, as well as investments and construction,
will be purchased and proceeded. This was remarked by many respondents to also affect
the quality and standard of health care and services provided by the facility. Practition-
ers, especially doctors, needed to be more concerned about costs of medical care and
treatment provided to patients. However, most of them guaranteed that the standard of
care would not be below quality or harmful to the patients. It is possibly not satisfying
the HA requirements or the level expected by the NHSO and the MOPH.
Many concerns were raised regarding of the impact of an inadequate budget on the
long term. If the situation is not changed with a better rate of the capitation budget in
the future, investment and improvements of public health facilities would be frozen or
even worse, as well as the standard and qualities of provided services. In the long-run,
consequently, this will affect not only the sustainability of the facilities themselves but
also of the whole health service provision system.
The director of a hospital cited a system called the “Robin Hood system,” which was
a cross-subsidization mechanism between the rich and the poor patients at the hospital,
and which collapsed after UC, as the hospital could no longer fully charge the rich
patients to subsidize the poor ones. It might be true that all patients with UC can get the
same standardized qualities of care no matter whether they are poor or rich, but under
the circumstances of inadequate capitation budget, the standardized care qualities
tended to lower standards, affecting all patients.
Some providers were critical that a huge part of the UC budget was inappropriately
buffered and spent on commanding and managing bodies at the MOPH and its local
offices, instead of being allocated to the level of practise at CUPs. Increases in the
capitation rates are meaningless if there are still huge parts of the budget buffered at the
national and provincial levels.
Some respondents at community hospitals mentioned that they agreed with the
consideration of the NHSO and strongly supported the idea to allocate capitation budget
to general/regional hospitals at a lower rate than to community hospitals because those
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hospitalsKhonkaen and Kalasin Hospitalscan earn revenues from other sources
much more advantageously from patients of the CSMBS and the SSS and high cost care
provisions.
From the interviews, some hospitals are reported to be currently indebted or to have
been indebted in the past. These hospitals are Khonkaen Hospital, Chonnabot Hospital,
and Waengnoi Hospital in Khonkaen, and Kalasin Hospital, Sahatsakhan Hospital, and
Kuchinarai Hospital in Kalasin. These hospitals can be grouped by causes and reasons of
being in financial deficits and debts as follows.
a ) Huge investments in physical infrastructure and medical equipment.
At Khonkaen and Kalasin Hospitals, as the general/regional hospital in the
province, investment is necessarily required in term of developments in new
technology and advanced equipment to enhance the higher treatment capabilit-
ies of the hospital. According to the interviews with the directors, the hospitals
were indebted even before the UC implementation, but the situation became
even worse after implementation when the budget allocated was based on the
capitation basis. Presently, investment expenditure of the hospitals is much
tighter. The deficits from the past have been greatly decreased as the hospitals
are trying to keep themselves in financial balance by spending as little as
possible.
b ) Inadequately allocated UC budget due to the factors of size and location of the
hospitals.
Deficits at Chonnabot, Waengnoi and Kuchinarai Hospitals are classified into
this group. In the cases of Chonnabot and Waengnoi Hospitals, the hospitals
cover a district with large area but with a (too) small population. The UC budget,
allocated on the capitation basis, is insufficient to cover expenditure of the
hospitals, of which the largest parts are fixed and uncontrollable costs. This
expenditure does not vary with the number of patients served by the hospitals,
such as maintenance costs of the hospital and salary of (the minimum required)
health workers. Even if there is an agreement by all hospitals in the province to
subsidize these small hospitals which are being indebted by using the common
money buffered at the provincial level, directors of these hospitals recommended
that the regulation of UC budget allocation with the capitation basis at the
national level should have specified the minimum guaranteed budget that all
hospitals would get.
In Kalasian, Kuchinarai Hospital is in a different situation. Due to the
location of the district which is in about  km from Kalasin Hospital and other
general/regional hospitals in neighboring provinces, Kuchinarai Hospital were
built up much larger than other community hospitals in the province and
equipped with many costly medical instruments and a large number of health
personnel. The intention was to empower the hospital as a hub for patients in
  	
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Kuchinarai district and neighboring districts who have difficulty accessing the
general hospital in the provincial city. Anyway, after the budget is allocated on
the capitation basis, the hospital is facing financial trouble because, compared to
the number of population in the district, the hospital is considered over-sized.
The director of the hospital informed this study that it has been hugely indebted
since  when the salaries began to be subtracted from the UC budget at the
national level (there used to be a financial surplus in ). Financial deficits
have persisted because the hospital has not stopped investing for its long term
improvements. The hospital received a provincial contingency fund from
Kalasin PPHO (from the UC budget buffered at the provincial level) of  and 
million baht in  and , respectively.
c ) Inefficient management of the hospital’s director.
At Sahatsakhan Hospital, immense financial debts of the hospital during the
beginning years of the UC implementation were claimed by a respondent to be
caused by mistaken and inefficient management by the previous director. Even
if the hospital is still indebted at the present, large parts of the debt have been
paid back by the present director. In this regard, the financial management skills
of the directorwho is a doctorare viewed crucial to the hospital’s financial
sustainability.
The hospitals that do not have financial troubles, in any case, have accepted
that they have frozen investments and tightly controlled the budget spending
since the UC was adopted, specifically since  when the salary began to be
subtracted from the UC budget at the national level. Most providers at these
hospitals expressed concerns, as discussed previously, regarding the impacts of
tight spending on the hospital’s long run developments.
Regarding the issue of salary subtraction, which is related to the attempts of
redistribution of health personnel, views of the respondents can be simply grouped into
three trends.
a ) Agreeing with the subtraction at the provincial level.
All directors of the community hospitals and PPHO’ staff interviewed in this
study totally agreed with the reformist view that the salary of health workers
should be transferred with the UC budget, subtracted, and allocated at the
provincial level to enhance reallocation of health personnel across regions and
provinces to be based on the number of population served by facilities in each
area.
The salary subtraction at the provincial level is believed to be able to
reallocate health workers to health facilities in shortage in the northeast region
and distant areas. In the short run, the hospital would be financially empowered
to hire more workers (doctors, nurses etc.) to relieve workloads of currently
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practicing workers. In the long run, depending on the director’s perspective, it
could possibly grant local students to study in nurse or medical schools with a
commitment to come back after the graduation to work for the hospital for a
specific period. Little by little, the drainage of health workers to central regions
and problems of workload in the northeast region would be relieved and solved
in the long run.
Under the current situation, hospitals, where the number of health personnel
is inadequate to number of served population, need to spend a part of their UC
operational budget, which is already quite limited, for hiring additional workers.
It was seen as a double financial burden on the hospitals compared with the
salary subtraction at the national level.
The decision of the switching of salary subtraction in  was viewed as it
was pushed by the benefit groups of health professions in the central region
having a good connection with those in the MOPH. Hospitals in central regions
are the beneficiaries from this decision. They comparatively obtain much more
UC budget per head (after including the back salaries of health workers allocated
at the national level) than those in other regions and, moreover, can generate
much more income from patients of other health schemes,) besides the  Baht
Scheme, with the advantage of a number of workers earning their salary mainly
from the UC budget. The switching to the national level was remarked to leave
the problems of inequitable health personnel allocations in the country un-
changed, and collapse the UC’s designed health system in the long run.
b ) Agreeing with (preferring) the subtraction at the national level.
Within this group, many providers cited that they agreed that the subtraction of
the salary at the provincial level can relieve health worker shortages at the
facility they are working in. However, as a public worker, the subtraction at the
national level is more secure and preferable to them. At the provincial level,
management of budget regarding the salary of health workers is seen as less
efficient than the management at the national level. Conflicts between hospitals
in the same province were also said to possibly occur, especially between the
general/regional hospital in the provincial city (with the largest number of
health workers and high-paid specialist doctors) and community hospitals in the
district level, if the salary was subtracted and allocated at the provincial level.
Another point of view is that the subtraction at the provincial level is not
believed to re-allocate health workers more to the needy regions, but instead
would accelerate brain draining and resignations of public health workers more
to the private sector, especially the doctor group. The shortage of health
workers in the northeast region is seen as a “structural problem” and malfuncti-




oning of the health system at the national level.
In addition, health practitioners cannot be attracted to the region only by
using financial factors or money incentives, but requires many more factors. For
example, in the case of doctors, most of the students who entered medical school
were from the better-off families in the cities. After their graduation and -year
commitment to work in a rural hospital with the MOPH, no matter how high a
salary the hospital can offer, it is still difficult to hold them in the rural areas.
c ) Not agreeing with the salary inclusive capitation method.
Some respondents interestingly disagreed with both methods of the salary
subtraction. They suggested that the salary should have been excluded from the
calculation of the capitation rate of the UC budget because the allocation of
health personnel in Thailand, even in the beginning, is not equitable to number
of population in many areas and this problem cannot be solved in financial ways
only. Using the financial ways with the subtraction of salary at the provincial
level would only squeeze health workers and personnel to leave the public
sector.
V Difficulties and Problems of Health Workers Shortage
at Public Health Facilities
The impact of these problems on the performance of the SNS strategy at the PCU/HC
level has already been described in the previous section. At the hospital level, similar
situations are also upsetting. The most influential difficulty is remarked to be the
shortage of health practitioners, mostly doctors and nurses, which is consistent with a
quote from the WHR  that “a shortage of human resources has replaced financial
issues as the most serious obstacle to implementing national treatment plan” [WHO :
]. With the constraint of an inadequate budget allocated under UC and the decline of
the hospital’s income from patient fees since  as explained in Section IV, many
hospitals have more problems in terms of workloads and tight budgets, which indirectly
results in another form of workloads for the hospital’s workers.
  Shortage and Misdistributions of Health Workers
According to the annex statistical Table  of WHR  [WHO ], total amount of
practicing doctors in Thailand both in the public and private sectors was 	 in .
As a ratio to the total population,  doctor was practicing for every 
 of population,
which was much higher than the ratio in other developing countries in Southeast Asia;
for example, Malaysia (  :  in ), the Philippines (  : 
 in ), and Vietnam (  :
 in ).
Considered only the public sector, the number of doctors who are practicing cur-
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rently nationwide is , according to Table . For the total population,  million,
one doctor is roughly taking care of 	
 people, while the standard ratio is properly
determined to be one doctor per 
 of the population.
At the regional level, in Table , the shortage of health practitioners is the severest in
the northeast region where, based on the necessary numbers of health practitioners
estimated with the Geographical Information System (GIS) by the MOPH, the percentages
of the shortages are the highest in all three professionsdoctors, dentists and pharma-
cists. The doctor-population ratio of the region is as high as  : 	, while the ratio of
Bangkok and central region are only  : 
 and  : 	, respectively. The misdistribu-
tions of health professionals across regions of the country are obviously evident. The
allocations of doctors, dentists and pharmacists are clustered in the capital city and
central region while are scant in the northeast region, where about one-third of the
population live.
At the provincial level, according to Table  and Table , the situations in Khonkaen
as a whole seem a bit severerwith higher percentages of the shortage of heath
professionals, based on GIS estimation by the MOPHthan the situation in Kalasin. By
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focusing on only the doctor group, the percentage of shortages in Khonkaen and Kalain
are  percent and  percent, respectively. However, comparing between the hospi-
tals in the provincial city of each province, Khonkaen Hospital, which is a regional level
hospital, is allocated a much better number of doctors than Kalasin Hospital, a general
level hospital. This is intentional because Khonkaen Hospital is a regional hospital for
tertiary level care not only for patients in its province but also neighboring provinces.
According to this, the community hospitals in Khonkaen tend to have a worse shortage
of doctors than the community hospitals in Kalasin.
Among the hospitals visited during the field survey in Khonkaen, Namphong
Hospital has the worst shortage of doctors in the province, followed by Waengnoi
Hospital. In any case, by the field observations, the situation of Waengnoi Hospital
appeared worse because of its disadvantageous geographical location. The hospital
is located in a rural district far from the provincial city, which is difficult to access by
public transportation. The turnover of doctors, including the director of the hospital, is
high, often nearly every year. The respondents at the hospital informed that not only
doctors but also other health professionals are not willing to practice at the hospital for
longunless they are local peoplebecause the district is quite rural and less developed
than other districts in the province. Workloads are also problematic at the hospital.
Since the district is far from other urban cities and its population is mostly poor,
the hospital is immensely depended on by people, with a large number of patients of
OPD and IPD.
On the other hand, Namphong is a district near to Khonkaen provincial city and most
of its habitants have a middle class income. Even if Namphong Hospital has a greater
shortage of doctors based on necessity according to the GIS, the situation tends to be
better as some patients in the district, as remarked by the respondents at the hospitals,
rather visit private clinics or hospitals in Khonkaen city.
In Kalasin, Kuchinarai Hospital has the greatest shortage of doctors. The hospital is
medium size, proportionately larger than other community hospitals in the province,
with 	 IP beds. Even if the hospital is located in a district far from Kalasin city, the
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district is more urbanized than Waengnoi Hospital in Khonkaen. Due to this dissimilarity
of urbanity, the doctor shortage situation in Kuchinarai Hospital differs from the situa-
tion in Waengnoi Hospital. Kuchinarai Hospital was built to be oversized relative to the
number of population in the district so as to also to serve patients that might be referred
from other community hospitals in neighboring districts. Unlike Waengnoi Hospital, the
shortage of doctors, thus, is not insufficient for the local population but for the popula-
tion it is intended to serve in the sub-provincial area.
There is the same reason for the shortage of doctors at Kalasin Hospital (a provincial,
general level hospital) and Khonkaen Hospital (a provincial, regional level hospital). At
Kalasin Hospital, the vice director said that the shortage of doctors at the hospital is
severer than estimated with the GIS, since the actual work tasks are heavily increased by
referred cases of IP from community hospitals in the province, which increased sharply
after . Occupancy of IP beds was cited often over the capacity ( beds) at the
hospital.
From Table  and Table , we can notice that doctors, dentists and pharmacists
are over-supplied at the Provincial Public Health Office (PPHO) in both provinces.
Because the PPHO is not a health facility providing health services to people, estimated
with the GIS, health personnel and practitioners need not be supplied there. In reality,
however, many health professionals are working there for managerial tasks and health
policy and strategic planning for the province. The professionals, even if not providing
medical care, are viewed to be necessary at the PPHO to some extents. But it was
criticized by some respondents that the number of professionals, especially doctors, is
inappropriately over-supplied. There are  and  doctors working at the PPHO,
including the head of the PPHO, in Khonkaen and Kalasin, respectively. This is seen as
a waste of professionals from the health service provision system to the management
division, which is not economical worth the costs to the nation of producing these
professionals. This is similar to the criticism of why the director of a hospital has to be
a doctor.
At the hospital level, the professions that are reported to be severely in shortage are
doctors and nurses. Even if the situation of nurses seems better overall than the situation
of doctors and other health professionals, the shortage of doctors has caused a negative
spillover on nurses’ workloads. Since doctors and nurses usually work closely, when the
number of doctors is not adequate to practicing medical care for patients in the hospital,
nurses then will be asked to assist to perform some medical practices, which mostly are
not part of their own duties but are part of the doctors’ duties, such as injections and
minor medical treatments. As mentioned in the issue of the relationship between health
professions, many nurses complained that they were overloaded and working far beyond
their own duties.
The inadequate number of doctors and nurses at the hospital is considered to be the
main cause of the failures of the Klai Barn Klai Jai (KBKJ) strategy of the UC policy in the
  	
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CUP at the PCU/HC level. Nurses, because of overwork at the hospital, cannot be
allocated to provide primary care at PCUs/HCs in the same CUP. Moreover, in some
CUPs, for example, Kuchinarai CUP and Waengnoi CUP, a medical team including
doctors, nurses and other health professionals is not able to rotate even once a month to
each PCU/HC to provide care for chronic patientsmainly, diabetes and heart disease
patients. The patients need to visit the hospital to see a doctor as appointed every month.
The failures of the KBKJ strategy are claimed to make the principle of primary care
networks of the UC policy unworkable because most of patients are still coming to the
hospital rather going to PCUs/HCs for the primary care services. This, as a result,
becomes a heavier workload on practitioners at the hospital and leaves them even less
possible time to visit or rotate to the PCU/HC level.
  Resignations and Drains of Health Workers from the Public Sector
The problem of health worker shortages, which consequently results in heavier work-
loads at the health facility, are exacerbated by the drainage of public health workers out
of the public sector. The factors driving this drainage vary with the profession groups
and are summarized from the interviews in Fig. .
A Drainage of Doctors
Drains of doctors from public hospitals to the private sector have been paid attention the
most by the MOPH, especially since the UC implementation. The doctor-population ratio
in the public sector rose significantly from  :  in  to  : 	
 in  when the
 Baht Scheme was introduced. The number of doctors resigning from the public sector
in  (	) was double the number in  (	) and kept increasing in  [Thamara-
ngsi ].
Thamarangsi [] found that of the  doctors who resigned during that period, 
percent were young, average age 	 years old, general practitionersof which half had
violated the government contracts on the  year term of compulsory public services.
Nearly half of them had previously worked in community hospitals. Large proportions
of this doctor group resigned from hospitals in the central region () and the
northeast region (
	). One of the interesting findings is that 		 percent of the
resigning doctors nationwide were originally from, or had a domicile in, Bangkok. In the
study, even if the reasons of the resignation were not investigated, the characteristics of
doctors who resigned from the public sector could imply some inferences about their
reasons for resigning.
From the interviews with doctors in Khonkaen and Kalasin, major factors that might
push the decision to resign from the public sector include:
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Fig.  Drains of Health Workers from the Public Sector
Note: Based on empirical interviews with health workers in Khonkaen and Kalasin.
  	
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a ) Disadvantageous returns in comparison with the returns offered by private hospitals
or clinics.)
This is cited as a primary but not necessarily the deciding factor, since the
satisfaction on returns depends on individual expectations and situation of each
doctor. Payoffs to a doctor offered by the public sector, in spite of being the most
prioritized compared to other health professions, are much less than half of the
payoff offered by the private sector. The newly graduated doctor in public
hospitals can be paid totally as high as  baht. Compared to the
minimum guaranteed salary rate offered by private hospitals which is roughly
at 	 baht as generally posted in the vacancy section in newspapers,
the public sector rate can be seen as very disadvantageous (according to the
principle of “opportunity cost”).
The gap of payoffs to doctors in the public and private sector is commented,
in this study and by some academics [Chanthorathat Na-Ayuddhaya and
Pinpratheep 
: ], to have been worsened by a conflict of policies of the
government in promoting Thailand to be a “medical hub” for foreign patients in
the region. Since, when the foreign patients, who can pay expensive medical
bills, come for medical care in the country, they mostly visit private hospitals not
public hospitals, this policy is seen to empower private hospitals’ ability in
paying doctors and attracting more health practitioners from the public sector.
Pannarunothai and Suknak [: ] has estimated and found that an
increase of  foreign patients visiting for care at facilities in the private
sector as a consequence of the policy would increase the demand for doctors in
the private sector by  doctors.
)
b ) Workplace and location of the public hospitals.
As remarked by some doctors, students who could pass the entrance examina-
tion to medical schools in Thailand are mostly those raised up in the cities,
especially in Bangkok, with better educational opportunities. After the gradua-
tion, due to the term of public service contracted with the government, those
doctors are required to work in a public hospital in rural districts of the country
for three years. Anyway, many of them tend to violate the obligation by paying
 baht as the violation fine instead and go back to the cities or their
domiciles, as found in Thamarangsi’s study.
 Na-ranong [		] pointed out evidence from a case study in community hospitals of the
MOPH that the determining factors for the resignation of a doctor from the public sector
were mostly financial, such as disadvantageous salary level and returns.

 The MOPH had a target of  million foreign patients visiting Thailand for health care and
service in , according to the Regional Medical Hub policy [http: //www.moph.go.th/
], which, if successful, would increase numbers of foreign patients from  million in
 [Karnchanajitra et al. ].
C. C=6B8=6C : Impacts and Constraints of Universal Coverage in Thailand’s Public Health
257
Of those who agree to follow the contract, many request to move back to the
cities after three years, if possible, from the rural district citing a reason to
further study in a specialist program or go back to their domicile. If their request
was rejected, some doctors might decide to resign from the public sector. Some
doctors at community hospitals, the young doctors, informed this study that
they also have plans to further study in a specialist program at a university in
Khonkaen city or in Bangkok after the commitment period, and are unsure if
they will return to the community hospital or not after becoming a specialist.
This explains the high turnover of doctorsand the directorand the absence
of long staying doctors at many community hospitals.)
c ) Workloads at the public hospital.
As a consequence of heavy workloads, malpractice becomes more likely because
doctors cannot spend much time with each patient. This, in turn, can be a cause
of anxiety of the practitioners under the situation that patients’ right protections
are recognizably promoted and medical malpractice suits by patients are more
prevalent especially as portrayed by mass media.
B  Resignations of Nurses
Nurses who resigned from public hospitals were mostly new graduates who were
employed by the public hospital on a temporary basis, as a temporary worker. Because
of the delay of a “public post” offering to the newly employed nurses (recently the delays
were reported sometimes over  or  years) and the declining numbers of public posts
offered at public hospitals, many newly graduated nurses currently working at public
hospitals feel insecure and unsure whether they will be offered a post as a public worker
(or civil servant). As a public worker, the nurses expect to have job security and
opportunities for promotion as well as superior welfare and protection provided by the
government. Confirmed by all the nurses interviewed, these conditions are judged to
strongly determine their willingness to work in the public sector, especially when
considering that the salary offered at public hospitals is generally less than the amount
they can earn at private hospitals.
The condition of delayed and uncertain public post offering might be a primary
 Furthering a specialist medical program is a progress in the profession in the view of many
doctors, as the pay offered in both sectors, especially in the private sector, are much better
than pay of general practitioners. The propensity to resign from the public sector of those
possessing specialist certificates is also higher than among the general practitioner group
[Weerawat ]. In the public sector, specialists are mainly needed only at general/re-
gional hospitals, not community hospitals, where there is not enough medical equipment.
The request to further specialise doctors at community hospitals, in this sense, can be seen
as another internal draining of doctors within the public sector from community hospitals




reason of nurse resignation in the public sector, but it is not the only reason. The decision
is, in most of the cases, also influenced by the condition of “workloads” on nurses in public
hospitals. Many providers at hospitals in Khonkaen and Kalasin reported that “public
posts” have become scarce and inadequately provided for by the government (via the
MOPH) related to number of nurses needed at the hospitals in practice. Due to this, the
hospitals need to hire extra nurses on a temporary basis using their own money from the
UC budget. Since nurses who will be hired will not be entitled to the benefits of being a
public worker, few nurses apply for these positions and the turnover rate is very high.
This is, at the present, one major difficulty at these hospitals.
When a nurse is a public worker, more than  percentexcluding those who retire
earlydo not leave the public sector for the private sector, unless with there are some
exceptional personal or family reasons. Nevertheless, even if draining from public to
private sectors is less probable within this group of nurses, internal draining within the
public sector from rural areas to urban areas is more evident. Empirically at one hospital
in a rural district of Khonkaen, “location of the hospital” influences significantly on the
nurse shortage problem. The conditions of “workplace”respecting location, urbanity
and distance from the domicileseems to be a determinant of the willingness to work of
nurses possessing a public post.
C  Drains of the PHO Group at the PCU/HC Level
This issue is related to the decentralization process of public services, including public
health, to the Local Government Organization (LGO), which is now in a transitional
period but is mandated to be completed nationwide in  by the Act on Operation of
Decentralization in , an organic law of the  constitution of Thailand.) To achieve
the decentralizing purpose as planned by the Act, the MOPH is required to transfer its
health service facilitiesPCUs/HCs, community hospitals and general/regional hospitals
and workforces as well as financial budgets to the LGO in each area, mainly at the
sub-district level. This will result in shifting away from MOPH around  percent of the
annual budget of the MOPH and  percent of the Ministry’s staff when the process is
completed [http: //www.moph.go.th/]). Due to many concerns mainly regarding the
readiness of LGOs and possible negative impacts on the health service provision system
from the decentralized management, the process of transfer and suitable implementation
are being designed and empirically investigated in  pilot provinces [Ouppayothin et al.
	].
At present, this is still ambiguous and undecided by both the MOPH and the LGOs
whether and how all public hospitals and PCUs/HCs should be transferred. During the
transitional period, the two basic units of LGOs, which are the Sub-district Local
 A LGO is set to be enhanced as an autonomous local governmental body in respect of both
budget financing and managements after the process of decentralizing.
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Government Organization (SLGO)) and municipalities,) covering a geographical area at
the sub-district level are required (practically by its main duties to provide public
services to the communities) to set up in its office a Fundamental Public Health Unit
(FPHU) and hire some health staff or academics to work in the unit. The unit is
considered to be functioning in overlap with the PCU/HC of the MOPH and situated in
the same sub-district as the services provided are similarly focusing on disease preven-
tion and health promotion (PP) services.
Informed by the respondents at the PCU/HC level and DPHOs in Khonkaen and
Kalasin, drains of health workers in the PHO group of the MOPH to the SGLOs (to work
in the FPHU) have tentatively started and are prevalent in many areas of the provinces
and in the northeast region. Out of  applicants for posts at SLGOs all over Kalasin,
for example,  applicants are those who are working in the PCUs/HCs of the MOPH,
according to a health academic at the Kalasin PPHO. Significant reasons for the drains
were denoted to be a) “unapproved Profession Act of Public Health Officers” by the
MOPH, and b) “professional discrimination” which is reflected in terms of an unfair return
structure and limited PC level progress of the PHOs at the PCU/HC level in comparison
with other health professions of the MOPH.
VI Systematic Constraints and Cyclic Consequences
in Public Health Service System
Findings on the issue of constraints and difficulties in health service provision activities
revealed in the field surveys are summarized in this section with aims to draw out
linkages and consequences of the situations from the PCU/HC level to the hospital level
in the public health service system at the provincial level. In this regard, Fig.  simply
depicts the systematic constraints and cyclic consequences digested from the interviews
with providers in Khonkaen and Kalasin provinces.
Based on the designed structure of medical care and referral network of the UC
implementation (Fig.  ), we found that impacts and failures of the policy intentions
caused by constraints and difficulties, both physically and financially, at each level of
health facility systematically affected and were affected in a cycle in the whole public
health system. According to this argument, three components are described to highlight
the causes, the consequences and the linkages of the systematic problems, which determi-
nate effectiveness and performance of UC, and as well were impacted by the UC
implementation, in the public health service system.
 “ ,” sometimes referred as “Tambon (sub-district) Administration
Organization (TAO).”
 Municipalities are the local administrations in developed provincial cities, established
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The components are titled as  ) the primary constraints,  ) the linking conse-
quences, and  ) the secondary constraints, and are explained as follows.
  Primary Constraints (Box A. /Box. B./ Box. C.)
At all levels of public health facilities, from the PCU/HC level to the hospital level, there
are primarily three factors in common that constrain the efficiency of operations and
provisions of health services for patients with UC. These include,
a ) Inadequacy (shortages) of health workforce, both by numbers and professions
b ) Under-financing UC budget with underestimated and ineffectively allocated
capitation rates, and
c ) Inconsistency between health strategies and public recognitions towards UC
Adequate number of staff (a) and properly financed budget (b) to facilitate work
tasks and assignments at health facilities are remarked as the most necessary factors in
operating the provisions of health services to achieve effective outcomes as expected by
the UC policy intentions. These conditions, however, are not satisfactorily met at most
public health facilities visited in Khonkaen and Kalasin, both at the PCU/HC level and
the hospital level.
The existence of these primary constraints, which finally results in increased work-
loads of health workers at most public hospitals and PCUs/HCs, is seemingly the same in
many other provinces nationwide, not excepting Bangkok. Cited in a speech by the
Minister of the MOPH, large public hospitals in Bangkok, such as Rajvidhi Hospital,
Siriraj Hospital, and Ramadhibodi Hospital, are still overloaded by excessive number of
patients visiting everyday even if they are university hospitals for medical students
staffed by an advantageous number of doctors compared to other public hospitals [HSRI
: ].
Somehow, shortages of health workers, both in terms of number and professions, are,
in the views of providers in this study, in most urgent need of support and solutions from
the government (specifically the MOPH), providers commenting that “workforce” is more
necessary and applicable to lessen workloads at the present than “money.” Even if a large
enough budget is provided for hiring additional workers, it is still uncertain if the PCU/
HC or the hospital can financially entice new health workers, especially doctors and
nurses, to work at the facility.
Another troubling matter, interestingly complained about by many health providers,
is about the inappropriate and misled understandings of the public (the Thai people)
towards the implementation of UC which are mostly inconsistent with its conceptual
intentions and policy objectives (c). This is claimed to be the mistake of over-
advertisement of the  Baht Scheme with the slogan “treating all diseases” by the
government that has misled people to be over-dependent on public health care system
social assistanceand less concerning with self-care, disease prevention and health




ies with more patients visiting healthcare facilities for care and, sometimes, over-utilizing
the facilities. Working hours and human resources are consequently devoted to curative
care work more than PP work, which is contradictory to the SNS strategy of the UC
policy, especially at the PCU/HC level.
In addition to factors mentioned as the primary constraints above, the promotion of
awareness on patients’ rights protection and more prevalence of medical malpractice
suits by patients have put more “anxiety and workload” on the health providers at all
levels of public health facilitythe PCU/HC level, community hospitals, and general/
regional hospitals.
  Linking Consequences
The ineffectiveness and failures of service provisions, caused by the primary constraints
and consequential increased workloads due to the UC implementation, at the lower level
of the public health facility are found to link to additional negative consequences to
facilities at the higher level in the public health systemfrom the primary care level to
the secondary care level, and finally to the tertiary level.
A Failures of the SNS and KBKJ Strategies: Negative Consequences from the PCU/HC
Level to the Hospital Level (Box. D)
Because of the constraints and workloads at the PCU/HC level, the SNS strategy
putting disease prevention and health promotion (PP) ahead of curative careand the
KBKJ strategyproviding health services near patients’ residenceof the UC policy
have failed to achieve effective outcomes.
The number of people falling sick has not declined and the patients who need just
primary care do not visit the PCU/HC in their residing sub-district but directly access for
care at the hospital level. Rates of care utilization at the hospital level, thus, tend to
increase and not decline even in the long run, especially of primary care, which can be
provided at cheaper costs at the PCU/HC level. This can be seen as wasting of health
resources, both in terms of money and human resources, at the hospital where is
supposed to concentrate instead on providing secondary and tertiary level of IP care. A
similar experience of this “out of sequence” utilizing behavior of people was also found in
Korea, caused by poor confidence of patients towards the qualities of care provided at
primary level facilities [Peabody et al. ], which is to some extent similar to the
situation as happening in Thailand.
B  More Tendency of the Referral of Inpatient Cases: Negative Consequences from
Community Hospitals to General/Regional Hospitals (Box. E)
Because of the constraints and workloads at the hospital levelspecifically community
hospitalsstimulated by the impacts of failures of the SNS and KBKJ policies at the
PCU/HC level, the referral rate of patients tends to increase from community hospitals (in
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the district level) to general/regional hospitals (in the provincial or regional level).
Due to the lack of an anesthetist and required technology and equipment, as well as
the shortage of health practitioners, most patient cases that require medical operations
and complicated treatments are remarked to be impracticable in many community
hospitals and need to be referred to the hospitals in provincial or regional city (Kalasin
Hospital or Khonkaen Hospital, respectively, in this study), especially the cases with
severe and risky conditions.
In the past, practitioners at community hospitals might take risks in practicing and
doing the operations even under these unequipped conditions of the hospital. Neverthe-
less, under the current situation when patients’ rights are being promoted with more
prevalence of malpractice suits by patients which are also reported by the mass media,
the practitioners become less likely to take risks and prefer to refer such cases to a higher
level hospital. On one hand, this is a good sign for better safety for patients from medical
malpractice. On the other hand, it causes a negative impact putting increased workloads
on the general/regional hospitals where health workforces and budget are also not
adequately supplied (relative to workloads).
Respecting this, it is possible that the community hospitals over-referring cases with
an intention to lessen their own workloads and push risks to other hospitals even if, in
fact, the hospital that makes the referrals is able to deal with the cases themselves. This
suggestion was made by the vice-director of Kalasin Hospital, a general hospital in
Kalasin province.
  Secondary Constraints
In term of cyclical consequences backwards from the hospital level to the PCU/HC level,
workloads and difficulties in providing health services at general/regional hospitals
result in generating the secondary constraints to community hospitals and PCUs/HCs as
follows.
A Not Possible or Bad Reallocation of Health Workforces in the Province (Box. F)
When the general/regional hospital, in the provincial city, is facing difficulties in terms
of workloads and shortages of health workers, it tends to attract and hire more workers
and practitioners, possibly using revenues it can generate from other sources of income,
not from the UC budget, such as fees from patients of the CSMBS and the SSS.
Thus it is possible to attract practitioners and workers from other districts in the
province or from the neighboring provinces to move into the city, which will worsen the
shortages of health workers, mainly doctors and nurses, at community hospitals, espe-
cially in rural areas. Even if presently the allocations of health personnel of the MOPH
are mentioned to be strictly based on the GIS, the situation in practice is still so far from
what it should be. Concerning the national level, by the same logic of systematic




attempts to reallocate health workers and practitioners from prosperous cities in Bang-
kok and the central region to needy health facilities in the northeast region are forecasted
to be fruitless and ineffective.
B  Impracticable Rotations of the Medical Team and Allocation of Nurses to the PCU/HC
Level from the Hospital (Box. G)
In a CUP, especially that with a community hospital, rotations of medical team and
allocations of nurses to provide primary care at the PCU/HC level will be even more
impracticable because of the worsened shortages of health practitioners, especially
doctors and nurses, and heavier workloads at the hospital.
In addition, under the current distribution method of the UC budget that most of the
budget in a CUP is flowing via the hospital to the PCUs/HCs, due to the larger number
of patients at the hospital both for outpatient and inpatient care as explained in Box. D,
the hospital tends to keep a higher proportion of the budget for curative care works
which will result in poorer financial support that it can allocate and provide to the PCUs/
HCs. Due to the lack of nurses and medical teams rotated to the PCUs/HCs together with
poor financial support from the hospital, workloads will become worse and the limited
provisions of for PP work will be even less possible to achieve the outcomes expected by
the SNS and KBKJ strategies at the PCU/HC level.
Other possible secondary constraints include a higher tendency of draining of health
workersdoctors, nurses, and the PHO groupboth from the public sector to the private
sector and within the public sector from the rural areas to the urban areas, which are
driven by the problems of workloads and low work motivation at all levels of health
facility, but tending to be severer in the rural areas. These constraintsboth the primary
and the secondary constraintsand the negative consequences affected by the im-
plementation of UC and its malfunctions simultaneously affect each other systematically
in the public health service systemfrom the PCU/HC level to the hospital level, from
secondary care hospitals to tertiary care hospitals, and from the provincial level to the
national levelwith backward negative consequences in a vicious cycle.
In the long run, if nothing is done to facilitate the constraints and improve the
difficult situations faced by the providers at all levels of health facilitymainly regard-
ing adequate health workforces and fundingthe persistence of such a cycle would
collapse the whole public health care system and remove the availability of good quality
of care provided with UC, as intended by the policy objectives. Public facilities and
health staff will suffer from terrible workloads and financial deficits, which tend to turn
chronically worse in the long run as workers drain from the public sector to private
facilities. The quality of care those facilities can provide would be ruined and less trusted
by the UC patients, increasing the tendency of malpractice suits and worsening patient-
provider relationships. UC, then, will become seen as social assistance for the poor people
or those who need help from the government, implicitly as a poor quality service for the
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poor, which contradicts its primary policy intention. The better-off, who can afford more
expensive care, would avoid visiting facilities using the rights entitled by UC but prefer
to pay out-of-pocket with hope to get better quality care and services, mostly at private
hospitals and large public hospitals.
Finally, UC may completely collapse and (implicitly) turn to be just a “targeting
scheme” providing social assistance to the poor only. When the time comes, those who
suffer and are negatively impacted in the end would be all Thai people, not only those
covered by the  Baht Scheme but also the SSS and CSMBS. This is especially true for
the vulnerable groups in the lowest income level who have no choice to opt out for better
access to good care.)
This is a “worst case scenario” of health care system as an impact of the UC
implementation with inappropriate management and under-financed budgets from the
government, as forecasted by Tangcharoensathien et al. [: ]. Even if cautioning
with similar concerns on the collapse of the health care system in the long run, however,
the causes that might lead to such the scenario, in that study, were solely due to
insufficient funding of UC, mainly the inadequacy and under-financing of the budget on
the capitation basis, to contracted providers.
Concluding Remarks
In this study, we assessed the views and opinions of health care providers in response to
various issues and in regards to the implementation, constraint and performance of UC
thus far at public health facilitiesProvincial Public Health Offices (PPHOs), District
Public Health Offices (DPHOs), community hospitals, general/regional hospitals and
Primary Care Units/Health Centers (PCUs/ HCs)in Khonkaen and Kalasin provinces.
From the interviews with health workers in various related groups and professions
including doctors, nurses, public health officers (PHOs), health academics, directors of
hospitals, heads of PCUs/HCsperceptions of the UC towards the providers, perform-
ance impacts of financing and structural reforms on the public health system, and patient
constraints on health care provision at the facilities were reviewed and discovered.
Mostly, providers possessed a good impression of the concepts and ideology behind UC,
and supported the introduction of the  Baht Scheme in Thailand to achieve universal
health care coverage for the people in the country. However, criticisms were also
mentioned regarding the hurried poor planning of the implementation, as well as charges
that the health system, itself, was still unprepared when the legislative act pushing UC
adoption forward was enacted.
 Negative spillovers of the UC implementation with the  Baht Scheme, regarding overcrowd-
ing and longer waiting time for care at public hospitals, on service delivery for patients of




In brief, other major issues discussed with respondents included a) the impact of
changes in the health care structure at the district level to be as a Contracted Unit of
Primary care (CUP), b) impact of the UC implementation both directly and indirectly on
the “relationships” of those involved in the health care system, c) the financial situation
and impact from changes in budget allocation under the new method of provider
payment under UC“the capitation,” d) problems and constraints regarding workforce
shortages at health facilities, an issue that remained even after the adoption of UC and e)
suggestions and comments for long-run improvements of the system.
Summarily, based on incidence and expressions from the providers, we can draw out
a depiction to explain linkages and systematic consequences of the situations in public
health service system from the PCU/HC level to the hospital level. The depiction simply
describes the current situation, and the impact of UC on the whole system of care
provisions with specific constraints at each facility level, and illustrates the systemati-
cally negative cyclic consequences of those constraints. Due to the “primary constraints”
at all facility levelsmainly because of a shortage of health workers and inadequate
budget financingthe SNS and KBKJ strategies of the UC policy face failures at the
PCU/HC level, which, as a result, do not reduce, but rather increase number of the
patients at the hospital level, both community hospitals and general/regional hospitals.
Unbearable workloads and poor equipment with a lack of specific needed professionals
(for example; an anesthesiologist) at most community hospitals at the district level has
pushed them to more often refer patient cases to general/regional hospitals in the
provincial cities because it is better and safer for patients. This is often viewed by the
general/regional hospital as over-referral, and puts a tremendous burden on them in
terms of physical workloads and financial cost.
We explained that these impacts from facilities in lower levels to those at higher
levels are “linking consequences,” which will eventually negatively result backward on
the lower level facilities in terms of “secondary constraints.” In the long run, if no attempt
is made to ease the constraints and improve the situationmainly regarding the inade-
quacy of the health workforce and fundingthis vicious cycle of negative consequences
could collapse the whole public health care system and UC. In the end, it is the Thai
people who face the greatest risk and are most susceptible to suffering from this.
As mentioned, systematic and cyclic consequences of the healthcare system in
Fig.  are found to start critically at the primary care level due to the failures and
ineffectiveness of the SNS and KBKJ strategies at the PCU/HC level. PP works are not
as practicable as expected by the SNS strategy because of the constraints of an insuffi-
cient workforce and a limited budget. An intention to empower PCU/HC to be a
gatekeeper for primary care and a key actor for PP works of the UC policy is found
inoperative in practice, which results in undiminished workloads at the hospital level
and, therefore, wastes health resourcesboth financially and physicallywhen consider-
ing the whole health system. From the field surveys we found that, among all the
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difficulties at the PCU/HC level, shortages of healthcare workers are the most significant
constraints concerning both the insufficient number of health workers and the lack of
needed trained professionals for primary curative care, especially nurses, and the
rotation of a medical team as required by the SNS and KBKJ strategies.
However, the lack of health professionalsspecifically doctors and nurses (regarding
the availability of medical team rotations)as well as the redistribution of them from
cities to facilities in need in the distant areas are structural problems which need time for
a better solution. In this respect, sufficiently supporting the budget is, therefore,
recommended to facilitate better workers and service provisions at the PCU/HC level. In
the short-run and medium-run, in spite of shortages and lack of health practitioners, a
flexible amount of budget and financial conditions can expedite better the work at PCU/
HC both for primary care and PP services. For instance, regarding primary care
provision, assistance workers can be hired for support tasks like cleaning and paperwork,
leaving health workers more spare time to do PP work. Additional money can also be
spent as supporting budget to the staff for going out to do PP work in the community,
such as for vehicle expenses or overtime pay for evening work.
In addition, the allocation of UC budget for PP service provisions should be sepa-
rately defined and directly allocated to the PCU/HC level. As evidenced, the PP budget
is included with the budget for curative care via CUP, in other words, the hospital, and is
sometimes inefficient as it is too dependent on the opinion towards the significance of PP
works by the director of the hospital, and also the relationship between the hospital and
the PCU/HC. When the budget is tight, it is possible that the part of budget which is
supposed to be allocated to PCUs/HCs will be partly pulled out to spend on curative care
at the hospital. Even if direct budget allocation would guarantee the amount of the
budget reaching the PCU/HC level for PP work, compared to the proportion of budget
designated for curative care (OP and IP budgets), it is still recommended to increase the
amount and proportion of budget for PP work in the calculation of the capitation rate
Concerning more equity of healthcare accessibilityespecially of the population in
peripheral areasand services at lower cost, in case the government is able to allocate
more budget on health it is suggested by high executive administrators in the MOPH to
focus more investment in primary health care institutions compared to those at the
secondary and tertiary levels [Tangcharoensathien et al. ]. Somehow, the suggestion
seems not yet to have been taken into account and brought into practice effectively by
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